| > Portada > Encuentros y Des-encuentros  Peruanos en Nueva York
Alex Julca, Ph.D. ¿Cómo viven los peruanos en Nueva York? ¿Cómo afrontan los problemas relativos al empleo, el idioma, y en general, el proceso de inserción en un contexto social y cultural que les es ajeno? ¿Qué papel tienen en este proceso las redes sociales de peruanos y de otros grupos de hispanos en Nueva York? Alex Julca, científico social peruano que reside en Nueva York desde 1990, responde a estas y otras interrogantes, incluyendo en su análisis tanto las micro dinámicas creadas por los peruanos migrantes en Nueva York, como los cambios que se han dado en la economía y el mercado laboral tanto en EEUU como en el Perú. Peruvian Networks for Migration
in New York City 's Labor Market, 1970-1996[+]
How do immigrant networks evolve and unleash large-scale immigration? Do networks of help and reciprocity help immigrants to cope with market instability? This chapter analyzes the case of Peruvian immigration to New York City through participant [1] observation over four years, using census data and data from interviews with sixty-five people living in Queens [2] and Brooklyn (all names of interviewees are pseudonyms), to shed light on the dynamic processes of kin and paisano networks in contemporary labor markets. While industrialization in Lima opened up possibilities for upward mobility to primarily Andean parents between the 1930s and the 1960s (first generation migrants), increasing urban stratification caused their endeavors to fall short. First- and second-generation Andean immigrants have carried the baton since the late 1960s by developing long-distance international networks. In 1996 there-were about 80,000 Peruvians in New York City , of whom about 64,000 were legal residents. [3]
This chapter has three parts. The first introduces the Peruvian community in New York City through three periods of historical development and then explores the corresponding structural composition of the New York City labor market. Discussion of the structure of the labor market emphasizes the level of job security (degree of unsteadiness), immigrant skills, state intervention, and degree of immigrant access to this market. The second part begins by defining Peruvian networks and the culture of social relations involved, continuing on to the analysis of the role of networks among Peruvian kin and paisanos for immigration purposes, and concluding with a discussion of the kinds of socioeconomic responsibilities assumed by members. The third part highlights the dynamic interaction of these two elements, labor market and networks: while the networks struggle to decrease the negative effects of unsteadiness in the labor market, many Peruvian immigrants continue to face challenges to their living conditions from the volatile political economy of New York City, and the relationships among network members are constantly transformed in the process of reacting to the unsteady market.
Although this chapter concentrates on the micro-level dynamics of network formation among Peruvians, the context is the increasing globalization of the economy and Peru 's accelerated crises as key stimulating factors, which propels migration from Lima to the United States . Hence, the globalization process is at work in tow ways. It helps cause the initial flow of migrants from Peru , whose weak position in the global economy creates macro-economic pressures for migration. It then shows up locally as New York City's labor markets are transformed over the course of the past thirty or more years into a global city, one possessing an hourglass economy: many jobs for the high skilled at the top and the low skilled at the bottom, but fewer ways to start with low skills and move into the middle class (Harrison 1997; Sassen 1991). One result of globalization's effects in Peru and in New York is the emergence of the transnational networks analyzed here.
Historical Evolution of Peruvian Networks in New York City
The migration process itself (first from the Andes to Lima starting in the 1940s, then from Lima to New York City after the late 1960s) has transformed kin structure and created new relationships. Long-range networks of support for the nuclear family have often weakened links with other relatives as well as paisanos, although relatives sometimes reencounter each other in New York City after a period of little communication in Lima . For example, during the first generation's migration from Quechua villages to towns and cities (1940s to 1960s), some kinship group members developed a separate integration into Lima 's society. Even when they maintained contact with members of the extended family, urban life in Lima encouraged them to develop new network branches on the job and in the neighborhood. As a result, migrants' children developed even weaker ties with their extended families. However, the migration of the second generation to New York (parents, sons, and daughters) added a new tone to kinship ties. Immigrants have sometimes relinked with extended family here, or relied on strong ties with former co-workers, friends, or neighbors from Lima . Reliance on strong ties with friends was especially common in the initial period of the late 1960s and early 1970S when the presence of kin members, and especially nuclear family, was not likely in New York City .
The Peruvian community in New York City has evolved through the following phases. From the late 1960s to the late 1970s, Peruvians arrived with documents (i.e., as “tourist visitors”). From the early to late 1980s, Peruvians arrived increasingly as undocumented immigrants, many later becoming legal U.S. residents through the 1986 "Amnesty Law." Since 1990, a Peruvian community has emerged, made up of a complex set of transnational immigrants, who are a combination of U.S. citizens, legal residents, and the undocumented.
Peruvian Networks from the Late 1960s to the Late 1970s
Although the Peruvian presence in the United States can be traced to the immigration of experienced Peruvian miners and Andean women to California in 1848 for the gold rush (Monaghan 1973), contemporary Peruvian migration networks in New York City were formed through a different process of social transformation. In the late 1960s in Lima , the growth in frequency and means of international communication was accompanied by an explosion in the urban population, which was predominantly young and literate. At the same time in the United States , the demand for manual labor for factories, in New Jersey and New York City in particular, intersected with the U.S. immigration law of 1965, which favored "family reunion" immigration.
In the 1970s, tourist visas to the United States were relatively easy to get in Peru . Travel agencies in Lima organized "tours" to the United States , whose real purpose was to facilitate immigration. These firms were in charge of requesting tourist visas for the travelers. The one-way airfare of $250 was funded from personal savings and loans from family members or close friends. Given the long-term scope of the migration enterprise, U.S. immigration meant a future source of social and economic capital for all people involved. Expected earnings in the United States were from eight to ten times higher than in Peru , and immigration would improve access to social services (such as running water and education); both were basic factors for stimulating immigration. However, immigrants were not fully aware that some expenditures in the United States were also higher than in Peru (e.g., rent), and that work, although available, would be physically straining, often involving a ten-to-twelve-hour workday, and a six-to-seven-day workweek. The responsibilities of sending remittances or of funding other relatives' immigration encouraged immigrants to work even harder.
Friends and paisanos were crucial for securing a foothold in New York City during this early Peruvian flow of immigration. Families slowly followed “pioneers” who established a beachhead upon which further immigrants disembarked. Full family immigration was not the most distinctive feature of these first years, partly because new immigrants were mostly young people (twenty to twenty-five years old). They took this opportunity with its aura of risk and adventure. Once in New York City they had to confront crucial challenges, such as gaining status as legal residents, learning basic English, and finding a permanent job. To solve these issues and to save enough to bring more family members to the United Sates often took several years-in some instance ten years o more. Not until the early 1980 did the “family reunion” type of immigration gain momentum and maturity.
Peruvian Networks in the 1980s
 At the macro level, the 1980s brought additional reasons for Peruvians to consider international migration. On one hand, the state of extreme violence resulting from the conflict between the Peruvian military and the forces of Shining Path had made the political scene very unstable and oppressive. On the other hand, the Peruvian economic situation deepened into crisis, with hyperinflation reaching 2,350 percent in 1989. This environment of economic and civil insecurity prompted would-be political refugees and economic migrants to flee Peru in increasing numbers, which is reflected, for instance, in the 100 percent growth of the Peruvian immigrant flow to New York City between 1980 and 1990 (Rodriguez 1995). This rapid growth of the immigration flow was made possible by the workings of the international kin and kith networks already established in the 1970s.
In contrast, however, to the easy absorption of immigrant labor in the 1970s, by the 1980s the New York City labor market had acquired a quite gloomy outlook. But also by the late 1970s obtaining a tourist visa had become more difficult because one had to produce documentation before the U.S. Consulate in Lima that one had enough financial resources-with bank certification-for a trip to the United States . This procedure often included showing proof of enough funds for hotel and discretionary consumption. Moreover, the U.S. Consulate increasingly required documentation of regular cash deposits and withdrawals from bank accounts, a secure job, and justification of the possession of wealth in fixed assets (house and car) for traveling abroad as a tourist. As a consequence, Peruvians increasingly came across the Mexican border, using underground multinational networks for immigration to the United States . The average cost of $4,500 for each new immigrant was again funded, as in the 1970s, by close family members or friends.
The critical situation of increasing numbers of undocumented immigrants, Peruvians included, was eased during the 1980s. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted amnesty to undocumented workers, and several hundred thousand people “came forward by the cut-off date of May 4, 1988” (Castles and Miller 1993). Presumably the fear of an amnesty hoax prevented even more undocumented immigrants from coming forward. Pepe, who was living in Brighton Beach ( Brooklyn ) in June 1989, told me about Peruvians who applied for legal residence under this edict from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS): "Under this amnesty program many in this neighborhood applied for residence. However, there was also fear in the community that this might be just a hoax of la migra [the INS] to catch illegals. …And yet, some recent Peruvian arrivals, in collaboration with their lawyers and some INS officials, have applied for this amnesty as if they had arrived well before 1986 and they have gotten their green cards.”
The legal amnesty for undocumented immigrants helped Peruvian immigrants to put down more secure roots in New York City and sponsor more family immigration (documented and undocumented). Moreover, some businesses founded by Peruvians who had come to the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s were more firmly established, including restaurants and travel agencies in the Bronx and Queens. Command of English, acquired on the job and by personal commitment outside of work, played a key role in helping these entrepreneurs develop business plans by facilitating the legal, logistic, and marketing relations involved in running a business. The new ventures included retail stores, restaurants, and travel agencies. Increasingly, Peruvians with a secure job that paid social benefits were also able to pay the mortgage for a house either in Miami or in upstate New York . In general, institutional and transnational ties with Peru were further fostered. Owners of these businesses promoted additional legal immigration to the United States by sponsoring kin or paisanos who wanted to come to New York City . And yet, the general character of most Peruvian kin and kith networks had primarily a working-class face (Bureau of the Census 1993a, b, d).
Peruvian Networks in the 1990s
There are some signs that Peruvian immigration continues at a similar pace as in the 1980s. The first reason is that the Peruvian economy has become increasingly even more fragile. Less than 15 percent of the working population in Peru have secure jobs, with wide unemployment among the ranks of young people. However, the labor market and the political environment in New York City have also limited immigrants' upward mobility. The unsteadiness of the U.S. labor market has intensified, following deregulation and restructuring from an industrial to a service economy. The competition among Hispanics and with other immigrant groups for finding jobs has substantially increased (Waldinger 1995). And yet the balance leans toward more Peruvian immigration, which also raises awareness of a high presence of undocumented immigrants.
The unstable labor markets in Lima and in New York City have increasingly prompted legal Peruvian residents to live in both cities almost simultaneously, traveling back and forth. They work for a short time in New York City , save, then buy clothing and electronic paraphernalia, which they sell in Lima . These Peruvians become couriers for New York City residents, transmitting remittances in kind and money to families in Peru .
Unsteadiness and Structure of New York City 's Labor Market
The employment picture for Peruvians in New York City (from the late 1960s to the mid-1990S) appears strikingly similar to what they left behind in Lima . The demand for commodities and the massive social mobility brought about by Peruvian modernization in the early 1940S was not accompanied by a boost in the demand for steady labor like the demand that inspired the late nineteenth-century immigration to the United States (Golte and Adams 1986). Peruvian immigrants in New York City are currently facing a similar period of economic change unaccompanied by the creation of enough steady jobs. As has been widely discussed in the migration literature, there have been two general shifts in the U.S. labor market over the past thirty years: the evolution from an industrial to a service-based economy and the decline in job security (unsteady labor market) associated with deregulation (Harrison 1997; Massey et al. 1996; Sassen 1988, 1991). Accordingly, the tendency for new immigrant communities to fill menial jobs has persisted.
Job security is defined by the market characteristics of the activity itself (seasonality and growth), underlying inequalities, the degree of deregulation, the strength of the relationship of the worker with management inside the workplace, and the market "niche" that the employing firm has. Recent statistics indicate that a large proportion of Peruvians are working in occupations that are likely to offer insecure employment and low wages. This trend has persuaded Peruvian immigrants in New York City to have 1.5 or 2 jobs to comply with their personal and social responsibilities. A comparison of the kinds of job in which Peruvians have found regular employment in New York and the kinds of job held by their Hispanic counterparts and by all workers in New York reveals some inequalities (Table 11.1). The rate at which Peruvian immigrant women are employed in the service sector (home care for the elderly, cooking, cleaning, babysitting), 13.3 percent, is much higher than the 10.0 percent average for all Hispanic working women and nearly double the 7.4 percent average for the total New York female working population. In contrast, in the basic office work category (“technical, sales, and administrative support”), where the work is a little cleaner and less physically stressful, the proportion of Peruvian women employed, also 13.3 percent, is much lower than both the 17.1 percent for Hispanic women, and the 20.5 percent for all women. Peruvian men [4] are more significantly employed in physically demanding blue-collar jobs, represented by the categories “precision production, craft and repair” (skilled manual labor such as in car mechanics) and “operators, fabricators and laborers” (heavy physical labor such as in construction work). Interestingly, this characteristic is shared by the entire New York working population, as is the more general trend of just over 40 percent of women participating in the New York labor market.
The overwhelming majority of Peruvian immigrants are not unionized, and manual work is often seasonal. Interviews indicate that the work load in garment factories also tends to vary with the fashion seasons, and contrary to stereotypes, both men and women are employed in these establishments. Furthermore, Peruvians are underrepresented in the occupational group most strongly correlated with job security, "managerial and professional" jobs: 13.8 percent of all Peruvians hold such jobs compared with 15.8 percent of all Hispanics and the almost double 3°.0 percent of the total population. The tendency toward insecure employment is also captured in the unemployment figures for Peruvian immigrants in New York City : 8.7 percent for Peruvians over sixteen years old, 11.3 percent for Peruvian women (Bureau of the Census 1993c, 313).
TABLE 11.1 Percentage of Employed Peruvians, Hispanics, and Total New Yorkers, by Occupational Group, 1990
|
Peruvians a |
Hispanics |
T alai New Yorkers |
|
Total |
Female |
Total |
Female |
Total |
Female |
Managerial and professional |
13.8 |
5.9 |
15.8 |
8.0 |
30.0 |
10.0 |
Technical sales, and administrative support services |
23.6 |
13.3 |
29.3 |
17.1 |
33.1 |
20.5 |
|
28.4 |
13.3 |
23.1 |
10.0 |
14.4 |
7.4 |
Precision prod. and craft |
13.1 |
1.1 |
10.1 |
1.3 |
9.4 |
0.8 |
Operators and laborers |
20.5 |
6.4 |
20.9 |
6.9 |
12.0 |
3.0 |
Farming and fishing |
0.6 |
0.1 |
0.8 |
0.1 |
1.1 |
0.2 |
Total |
100 |
40.1 |
100 |
43.4 |
100 |
41.9 |
|
Source: Based on the Bureau of the Census 1993c, Employed persons 16 years and over.
a Includes U.S.-born Peruvians. Peruvians number about 5 percent of all Hispanics. |
As for the characteristics that Peruvian immigrants bring to the labor market, these include a skills "mismatch" and lack of command of English. Peruvian immigrants in New York are on average thirty years old, and most of them are sons and daughters of previous migrants from the provinces of Peru to Lima . One reason their parents made the move to Lima was to guarantee their children a high school education, and in fact Peruvians in New York State are highly likely to have a high school diploma: 82.4 percent of Peruvian men and 83.2 percent of Peruvian women in New York State between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four are at least high school graduates, and 13.0 percent of legal Peruvian immigrants over twenty-five have completed college studies (Bureau of the Census 1993c, 309). Thus, most Peruvians in New York City have higher qualifications than what the market demands.
Growing up in Lima also provided most Peruvian immigrants with urban job skills such as construction, mechanics, driving, electronics, and sewing, and, among professionals, accounting, engineering, teaching, and administration. However, even in those cases where Peruvians bring with them skills that are in demand in New York City, differences such as the traffic flow, urban structure, tools, work space, and administrative organization mean that immigrants have to learn new features on the job, passing through a "get used to" process. As Perico in Astoria says, "It is not difficult to learn how to install parts and fix these windows [which are different from those found in Lima], but I also have to learn where to buy them and their proper English names. Or when installing tiles on the floor [a better paid skill], the technique, basic materials, and tools are different from the ones used in Lima , so I would like to learn that."
Lack of command of English does not prevent an immigrant from finding a job, but it greatly reduces promotion potential and the possibilities of switching from temporary to permanent employment. Furthermore, English skills qualify an immigrant for cleaner and less physically stressful jobs, such as secretarial and sales positions. In New York City only 42 percent of Peruvians have strong English proficiency, which is lower than the Hispanic average of 56 percent (Bureau of the Census 1993c, 244, 309), which in turn is lower than the non-Hispanic white average of 90 percent (Rodriguez 1995). Peruvians quickly learn that language limitations reduce the scale of informational resources to Spanish newspapers, Spanish television channels, and communication with other Latinos. Command of English links the immigrant to wider job networks and increases his or her desirability to an employer because the employing firm also wants to access wider networks. For instance, Pepe, who lives in Brighton Beach (Brooklyn), in 1989 was not promoted to foreman in a private construction firm in Manhattan because his English was poor. He knew that learning English would have improved his ability to deal with Manhattan residents and his prospects for mobility in the construction sector in general.
Frequently Peruvians learn English on the job, beginning with basic words and phrases used colloquially. They then increase their vocabulary as they are exposed to circles of other English speakers, such as bilingual Puerto Ricans and non-Latino bosses and co-workers, and people they meet and must deal with outside of work, including other apartment tenants, landlords, telephone operators for public utilities, and grocery store owners. English proficiency is crucial at jobs with high potential for promotion, such as building maintenance and administration, in addition to construction. "My husband decided to learn ten new English words a day [twenty years ago], and that is how he improved," Luisa, Victor's wife, commented. Victor's English proficiency was enhanced also by his work as a doorman in a building in midtown Manhattan , where most of the residents did not speak Spanish. Victor and Luisa live in Jackson Heights (Queens). Whenever time constraints work against the desire to overcome lack of English proficiency, Peruvian parents register their children at English or bilingual schools. "When we look for an apartment or need to call AT&T, Luisito reads the newspaper or talks on the phone," said Sophia, who lives in Flushing , praising her ten-year-old son. Sophia intends to raise a child who will offset her own educational shortcomings.
State intervention in the labor market leaves clear marks on immigrant mobility options, to which immigrants respond by gathering substantial economic and informational resources from the network. Because there is no more powerful barrier to immigrant settlement and social mobility than the condition of being undocumented, Peruvian community networks are structured around the distinction between "legals" and "illegals." "How did you come [undocumented through Mexico or with legal visa]?" would be the first question-right after exchanging names-that an "old" Peruvian resident would ask of a recent immigrant to New York City . According to the answer, many "old" Peruvians (documented and undocumented) will use the answer to evaluate the degree of risk and trust for entering into social and economic commitments with their fellows.
The need to legalize immigration status to better access the labor market makes obtaining residency the highest priority for undocumented Peruvian immigrants. Legal immigrants can more easily use formal channels for their job search, such as newspaper want ads, employment agencies, and New York City government offices, and can therefore have fuller access to the spectrum of labor demand at shops, factories, and subcontractor and service establishments than their illegal counterparts, to whom these avenues are generally closed. In construction work, legalization increases the possibility of finding employment with a firm that can sponsor union membership, and thus the possibility of more steady work and social benefits. Obtaining a “green card” plus a job with social benefits means an immigrant will have deeper roots of incorporation into U.S. society, including active citizenship, since now the immigrant has "something to thank this country for.” But legalization in itself is not enough. Access to better-paying or less physically stressful jobs that do not involve manual labor require further language and professional qualifications and the right contacts. Nonetheless, a legalized immigrant experiences less psychological pressure than does the undocumented immigrant, who leads a fugitive life and for whom every day is a series of risk-filled events.
For the legalization process, Peruvian immigrants use illegal as well as legal strategies. For example, sometimes INS employees can be bribed to facilitate status, and some U.S. residents can be paid off to enter into fake marriages. According to a sotto voce motto among members of the Peruvian community: “To marry a legal resident [or get the green card] is like winning the Lotto or even better. Puerto Ricans and other legal residents know this, that's why they charge from $2,500 to $3,500 to arrange marriages. They need the money anyway-many of them live on welfare.” Although some immigrants obtain false green cards and false Social Security numbers to access certain jobs, they are never certain that these false documents will be accepted at another job. Furthermore, lack of permission to work can also prevent immigrants from obtaining other documents, such as driver's licenses or bank cards, which in turn close the avenue to other jobs and credit opportunities.
Kin and Kith Structure of Peruvian Networks
The use of kin and paisano networks by Peruvian immigrants to find jobs is rooted in the social fabric of negotiated help and reciprocity inculcated, since childhood There are three basic circles of relatives tying Peruvian immigrants together: nuclear family, extended family, and paisanos. Of all the kin to whom an immigrant is related, the closest ties are to the nuclear family. Families in Peru have on average four or five children, and siblings are particularly important in the migration endeavor because they have been brought up to support one another as well as their parents. Moreover, older children have the responsibility to help raise their younger brothers and sisters and give advice and support even in adulthood. In New York City , brothers and sisters are the first to be called upon to mobilize the community to find a job for the newly immigrating younger sibling. The reciprocal sense of obligation between siblings is so strong that monetary advances may be returned in the form of nonmonetary favors (such as house construction, chores, babysitting, job search, and information sharing), making the means for meeting obligations more flexible. However, for the same reason and because of the density of reciprocal ties, conflicts between siblings might have a disturbing effect on network dynamics by breaking or transforming the tie.
Members of the extended family provide the same type of information or financial assistance as the nuclear family but are less obligated to do so. Nonetheless, if an immigrant is the first person in his or her nuclear family to immigrate to New York City, he or she will try to find out if any extended family live in the area, though the less flexible relationship of rights and obligations may persuade immigrants to concentrate their energies on developing stronger ties with paisanos and friends.
Whereas in Peru paisanos are related by descent from the same geographic space (often from the Andes), in New York City paisanos include all Peruvians, and the term might even be extended to other Latino immigrants. Dario says, “I am more paisano with somebody from Cusco in the Andes, but I am also paisano with any Peruvian. Maybe the Dominican lady from the video store is like a paisana, too, because she speaks Spanish.” If a person is the first in the family to immigrate, he or she might build a paisano network by asking neighbors, colleagues, or schoolmates in Lima for contacts in New York City, and once in New York City by seeking out other Peruvians.
Most Peruvian immigrants after arrival try to reach out beyond their kin to paisanos by participating in church, soccer, school, and party activities. The contacts made here will be vehicles for information and better jobs, second, part-time jobs, and immigrant legalization endeavors. However, the predominantly reciprocal relationship in the nuclear family has as its counterpart a more negotiated relationship among paisanos. Conflicts may occur because its values and relationships and the money involved are not homogeneous (Zelizer 1994). If ties between paisanos are weak or semi-weak they will not loan money without charging “loan shark” rates of interest, because for some Peruvian families money made by lending is fundamental for their economic living. The practice of charging a high rate of interest is also due to the high possibility that the borrower will default on the loan, where there is neither a formal enforcing mechanism nor as strong a sense of moral obligation as exists between family members.
Although the nuclear family is the basic resource for help and reciprocity, there is no neat division of Peruvian networks in New York City into the two categories kin and paisanos. Each migrant's particular history creates the actual possibility for using the potential link between two points-nuclear family, extended family, or paisanos-in the network. Perhaps during his or her lifetime, the migrant will not develop even 50 percent or his or her networking possibilities. Migrants, however, keep in mind each feasible useful tie, new or old, developing some while abandoning others. "I meet people in the subway, at my job, anywhere …I especially cultivate relationships with my aunts, uncles, and cousins … One has to sembrar [sow] here and there," Perico confessed.
Strategic and Bounded Economic Roles of Peruvian Networks
 An important issue for Peruvian immigrants is how to contact the labor market. Peruvians' knowledge of the wide New York City labor market is limited to what their contacts tell them. For a new immigrant, particularly if undocumented, the network of information for jobs consists, basically, of kin, close family friends, and telephone numbers of contacts given by friends in Lima . Luis, who arrived in New York City six months ago, said, "I am going to visit a Peruvian friend in New Jersey . I asked him on the phone about a job and he wanted me to come to his house to talk about it.” Luis lives in Flushing ( Queens ) and works in a carpentry shop around this area. His friend has lived in New Jersey for about twenty years and currently works as a doorman at a three-star hotel. Before leaving Peru , Luis compiled a list of addresses of people whom he could contact in the New York area, some of them collected when these people returned to Peru to visit. Luis brought this list even though his mother and sisters, already living in Queens for about three years, offered to host him and put him in contact with his new employer. His faith in the contacts he can make through the network is matched by employers' support for the strategy, because “network hiring, in which current employees bring their friends and relatives to fill vacant jobs, eliminates many costs of recruitment and training while providing high quality employees, since coworkers are only likely to bring into the workplace new workers who will be dependable” (Migration News 1995).
For Peruvians, as for some other immigrant communities, the purpose of immigration is to improve the social and economic welfare of the family, not just that of the individual immigrant. To make this goal feasible, Peruvian immigrants share what might be called a culture of social and negotiated reciprocity, in striking contrast to the predominant culture of individual self-sufficiency prevalent in the United States.6 Although investment in social relations is strongly stimulated by long-term benefits, in the short term there is an expectation of concrete rights and obligations. If in the short term there are no signs of reciprocity, the tie has a strong possibility of breaking or of developing only weakly (particularly if lack of reciprocity is a trend).
Peruvian migrants on the move know that there is more risk than certainty in what lies ahead, so their strategies tend to be to tie to one another, to exchange resources, and to assign different roles, as well as to punish those who “misbehave.” For example, help in pursuing studies might be compensated with household work and a place to stay with a “voluntary” contribution from the weekly wage; an uncle praises a nephew's accomplishments in exchange for the nephew's advice to the uncle's child; a reduced rent is granted in exchange for “voluntary” babysitting a few hours a week. Networks, ultimately, become a special and crucial kind of asset, with expected shortand long-term social and economic returns. Thus, their power is greater than that of a purely economic investment.
Socio-Economic Commitments, Tensions and Dynamics of Reciprocity
The opportunity for economic and social improvement opened to the family by immigration cannot occur without draining the resources available to the network (in both the Lima and New York City branches). The immigrant, therefore, assumes the responsibility to reciprocate by complying with commitments to family and paisanos. Social commitments might include repaying debts, sending remittances, and helping other members of the family to immigrate. The ability for the new immigrant to comply with these social responsibilities, however, will depend on the job or jobs he or she finds in New York City and on his or her actual ability to save.
Pressure to repay debts affects the job in three ways: first, the immigrant must perform well on the job, or even over perform, in order to keep it; second, the immigrant attempts to become skilled as soon as possible; and third, he or she is likely to take a second job or additional shifts. New immigrants are likely to arrive in New York City with debts or social commitments, whether they arrive legally or illegally and whether or not they have family in New York City , partly because the average income in Peru is about $120 a month, while the cost of airfare to New York City is $1,200. If the immigrant is undocumented, the costs may rise to around $5,000. These costs demand the participation of kin, paisanos, and friends, who sometimes will be lending their life savings. The immigrant turns to close family first, but if they do not have the resources, the immigrant will then turn to extended family, or to close friends and paisanos. The best results are achieved by those who have well-cultivated relationships with some of these network contacts. Of course, if the immigrant has contacts already earning dollars in New York City , it may be easier to raise funds for immigrating (Massey and Garcia 1987). And the probability that the New York City contact may advance money for the immigration expenditures is higher the closer the family relationship.
Would-be immigrants do not only call upon the network for financial resources. The immigrant leaving Lima may ask for assistance with taking care of children while he or she is away, or with cooking if the mother is immigrating. More to the point, it is understood that brothers and sisters of a woman whose husband is immigrating will look out for her while he is away, and vice versa. Outside the family, would-be immigrants ask friends and paisanos in Peru to put them in contact with any relatives they may have in New York City . Once the immigrant settles in New York City, he or she then reciprocates, again sometimes using informational or labor resources rather than money, for example, by passing on to Peru information about job opportunities in New York City or by sending gifts or by sending back goods requested from the United States for family or paisano businesses based in Peru.
Nonfinancial assistance is particularly important for women with young children in New York City , since even if a job is available, they cannot work until they find a babysitter. If parents or other kin are not available at home, child care will involve stringent time coordination and probably require assistance from close friends (or neighbors) outside the home. When child care cannot be arranged, jobs or promotions are simply not taken. Elsa is a dramatic case, since she works the nightshift as a data-entry operator at the U.S. Post Office, and her cousin Perico takes care of her child at night. Even with this assistance, Elsa expresses the extreme stress to which she is subject, in her comment, "Sometimes I only get two hours of sleep."
If the immigrant was able to borrow from family, the repayment obligation may be tempered by social processes. For example, maybe the immigrant can find a job someday for the son of the sister who lent him the money. However, the extended family tends to be less flexible than the nuclear family when lending money because something the immigrant does for the nuclear family will not necessarily help the extended family financially: if married, the extended-family member is supporting a separate nuclear household. The extended family usually expects repayment as soon as they learn that the immigrant has obtained a steady job in New York City .
Remittances are a second social responsibility that immigrants using the family network assume. When a person immigrates, social improvement for the family is only potential. The immediate effect is to cut physical contact, particularly difficult for other members of the nuclear family (spouse or children). The immigrant needs to send remittances to Peru as soon as possible as a sign that the immigration process is worth the effort and will improve the family's well-being. Among the different kinds of remittance obligations, those to spouse and children back in Peru are strongest. They should be large and especially stable. The spouse and children need funds for housing, food, and school. Even if the spouse works in Lima or has already immigrated to New York , the he or she is obligated to send remittances to children. Although varying in degree, this commitment is permanent and nearly unbreakable.
Immigrants also tend to help parents who are still in Peru by sending them remittances. Although pensions for senior Peruvians are often not sufficient to cover basic living expenses, the ones who have siblings overseas probably do not depend for their entire income on the immigrant's remittance because their other children also help support them, each according to his or her means. Remittances to parents may take the form of goods or currency for living, for health care, or for birthday and Christmas gifts. “Today I will send the remittance in kind to my mother, poor woman, she will be needing it,” “La Cholita” would say, on one of the occasions on which she sent encomiendas to her family. Even grandparents, who often had helped parents to raise the kids, are subject to attention from Peruvian immigrants, who send them remittances when not sponsoring them to come to “los Estados Unidos.”
Sometimes remittances flow the other way and parents use their skills to help their grown children. For example, when parents who are construction workers might help to build or improve their children's homes, either in Lima or in New York City . Maria invited her father to New York City on a tourist visa so that he could visit her and his grandchildren but also assist in the construction of the sewage system for her new house. "Here it's different," her father told me. "The parts are generally plastic, not like in Peru, where they are usually metal. But some of the parts might be interchangeable, so I am taking a few back to Peru to use with my clients."
Immigrants with some years of settlement in New York City also send remittances to the family for buying land (in the countryside or the city), for buying material to construct a house, or for opening or improving a small store. The house might be for the parents or it might be for the immigrant's dream house, to be occupied on his or her return to Peru at some future date. In either case, the siblings might live in the house temporarily in return for taking care of .parents or preparing for the immigrant's return.
Whereas with parents the immigrant has an obligation to give without expecting to receive anything in return, with siblings there is an ongoing back-and-forth relationship of benefit and obligation. The immigrant might, for example, fund an entrepreneurial venture in Peru , such as a store or a restaurant, so that a brother or sister could earn a living. But along with the funding would go the expectation that the sibling would use part of the income to support the parents. Supporting parents or helping younger siblings could be the reciprocal obligation in lieu of repaying the total loan in currency.
The best way for an immigrant to help his or her family, however, is to bring a family member to New York City. But first the immigrant must spend two or three years establishing himself or herself and in that time presumably become a legal resident, find a stable job, and perhaps accumulate some buffer savings.
Peruvian networks facilitate accumulation of the savings necessary to meet social obligations such as debt repayment, remittances, or funding new immigrants is through the organization of juntas. This financial mechanism is the Peruvian immigrant version of the “rotating credit association” studied by Geertz and Granovetter (cited in Portes ]995a, 137-42). A junta is a savings and credit system organized by a group of six to ten immigrants, documented and undocumented. Mutual trust among the members of the junta is the key to its success. Group members are often related by kinship, paisano, and job-ties and are not necessarily Peruvian. They may be Colombian, Puerto Rican, Dominican, or Ecuadorian. Each member deposits a certain amount of money weekly, and one member has the right to use the total money gathered. “We deposit $100 each week; for example, next week it's my turn, so I will receive $1,000 because we are ten members. This money I will use to buy a video camera and to send money for Christmas to my relatives in Peru ,” Jenny explained to me. She added, “In this way one can 'see' the money, because if we don't do this, money disappears like magic. Do you want to take part in this junta.” The person who organizes and administers the junta benefits by receiving the first week's “pot” but in return for this right assumes the obligation to cover any member's default or delay in the weekly quota.
The enforcement of the social commitment is based partly on the immigrant's own shared belief in family care and reciprocity, and partly on the immigrant's thirst for prestige and power (control) over resources. However, the immigrant may not be able to pay back the debt as quickly as the creditor desires, or the immigrant may find a conflict between debt repayment and remittance obligations. The network has social enforcement mechanisms to promote repayment, despite such conflicts, through the flow of information between its New York and Lima branches. For example, the people the immigrant is staying with in New York City are often related to the creditor in Lima . Through them, it is not difficult for the creditor in Lima to learn the level of the immigrant's success in New York City . Furthermore, the immigrant still has family in Lima who want to maintain good relationships with the benefactor who granted the loan.
Cash constraints may lessen the amount of but do not excuse regular debt repayments or remittances. Perico, for example, working an average of three or four days a week in his first year in New York City, earned about $13,000, of which $2,200 went to repay debts and $3,500 was remitted to his wife and children. However, he has not finished repaying his debts, and remittances to his family sometimes fluctuate. “If it were not for my debts, I would be saving to legalize my immigration status, so I could visit my family in Peru and eventually bring them here,” Perico added.
A humble way to gain prestige is to meet one's social obligations. Thus, the immigrant who pays his or her debts on time, sends remittances to Peru , or makes it possible to bring a new immigrant to New York City also forges prestige in his or her family and close friends in both Lima and New York City . To be able to fulfill all these commitments often means that the immigrant has a regular stream of income of one or several jobs and so could likely serve as a liaison with other Peruvians or family members for job recommendations and various kinds of contacts. The person who administers successful juntas also gains a reputation as trustworthy and reliable, making it easier for him or her to organize new ventures.
Those who do not comply with the network's moral code, however, are punished. For example, Duly, a New York City resident for two years, would inform her friends about her "ungrateful" brother: "Esteban is a bad son because he never sends his mother a penny." To repeat, conflicts based on perceived breakdowns in reciprocity between brothers and sisters can generate transformations in the network itself, possibly manifested in less dense or tight ties between them. Another example of the network's disapproval concerns Camilo, who worked as a stevedore in Lima before immigrating to New York City . He could not repay on time the expenses incurred by the Peruvian woman, owner of a garment factory, who funded his immigration through Mexico . He had to tolerate the teasing of his friends and harassment in the street by his creditor. According to his friends he might not have put enough effort into complying with his debt, and as a result he does not enjoy the trust of the Peruvian neighborhood in Brighton Beach ( Brooklyn ). Thus, even though he has been in New York City for several years, his job and housing situation remain fragile.
The ultimate punishment that the network can impose on a defaulting member is de facto, often temporary, ostracism. Fausto provides an example. He is a legal resident in the United States , speaks English, and has regular employment. He invested $60,000 in a fourteen-wheel tractor-trailer for a business in Peru hauling freight across the Andes . He financed the purchase through a combination of personal savings, banks loans, and a personal loan from his aunt in Lima . The collateral for the bank loan was his aunt's house. After several months of operation, the tractor-trailer suffered a serious breakdown that Fausto could not afford to repair. His aunt demanded that Fausto return to Peru or pay the overdue debt, but he could do neither, leaving the aunt in the position of repaying the debt herself or losing her house. In attempting to control the situation, Fausto wound up accumulating additional debts in New York . Finally, he fled to a Peruvian friend in Ohio to escape the moral censure of his family network.
Dynamic Links Between Peruvian Networks and New York City Labor Market
Unsteadiness in the labor market has four visible effects on the workings of Peruvian networks: it increases the new immigrant's dependence on the host network; it requires flexibility in the length and location of the workday, which affects the role of members of the household; it increases reliance on network contacts beyond kin; and it increases the importance of bringing additional family members to New York City. Increased dependence on the host network occurs during the first period of adaptation. Since obligations are more elastic between nuclear family members, an unreliable job situation makes it more important for the new immigrant to be hosted by nuclear family. The advantage of relying on nuclear family rather than extended family or paisano, in terms of favors or loans, is that the time frame and form for meeting the respective obligation tend to be longer and more flexible, respectively. In terms of jobs, nuclear family is likely to be more diligent about locating one. for the new immigrant. In terms of housing, the nuclear family is more likely to endure overcrowding and delayed payment of the rent. The absence of family members in New York City , for example, made Dario's situation more precarious. When hosted by his paisano, Pepe, he had to make rent and utility payments immediately. Close kin would probably have been more flexible in the first months while Dario looked for work.
Because of unsteadiness in the labor market immigrants might take on a second job, or they might work overtime at their first job or take home piece work that could be for their own employment or for that of other household members. For example, sewing and jewelry making are activities subject to household (often kin) involvement. Although this strategy brings work stress home, it does not necessarily decrease time shared with family. Rather, it changes the activities and roles that family members play while at home. The net benefit is the higher likelihood of accumulating savings to comply with social commitments, in addition to coping with basic economic needs. The likelihood that two or more household members become involved in wage-earning activities is probably the reason Peruvian annual household income in New York City averages $25,000, among the highest in the Latino community (Rodriguez 1995).
 The unsteady labor market also increases reliance on contacts with paisanos and friends, pushing immigrants to make contacts beyond kin networks among paisanos and relatives of friends, friends of relatives, friends of friends, old friends and former neighbors from Peru , and new neighbors and co-workers in New York City . Among undocumented Peruvians, this drive to build ties beyond kin is also stimulated by the need to make contact with people who can assist in getting the legal ID necessary to get a job (a Social Security card, or a sponsor for a work permit). Strong ties among paisanos are fostered, for example, at the soccer gatherings that take place almost every day in various public parks in Brooklyn and Queens , among men on weekdays and with family participation on weekends. These are propitious occasions for exchanging information about jobs, wages, and legalization-as well as for getting updates on various social issues in the Peruvian community, such as parties, gossip, Spanish television soap operas, boyfriends, girlfriends, and news from Peru . Frequent informal gatherings at the household level and beyond, including different kinds of weekend family parties (for welcoming new arrivals or celebrating baptisms, birthdays, and holidays), and informal conversations at the workplace all help to keep the networks lubricated. In general, other Latino friends and intermarried couples are invited to Peruvian parties. Sometimes as many as 50 percent of the guests are other Latino non-family members who, together with Peruvians, dance Dominican merengue for most of the party.
The fourth effect of the unsteady labor market is to increase the importance of bringing additional family members to New York City . An unreliable job means unreliable income, so the probability that anyone person can send remittances to Peru regularly is lower. However, if the family sends additional members of the same nuclear household to New York City, there will be two positive effects: the presence of more than one household member in New York decreases the probability of fluctuating remittance flows, even if the paychecks for each person continue to be unsteady, and there will be fewer dependents in Peru relying on the remittances.
Conclusion
Peruvian kin and paisano ties have enabled and constrained the attainment of upward mobility in the unsteady New York City labor market over the past thirty-five years. Peruvian immigrants face different degrees and kinds of risk according to their positioning and the strength of ties to their nuclear network. The alternatively harsh, thoughtful, strategic, and risky decision-making of Peruvian immigrants reflects the uncertain political economy in which they have been operating. It also reflects their determined defiance of this uncertainty and their attempts to exploit the opportunities it sometimes presents. Whereas the New York City labor market puts downward pressure on the improvement of Peruvians' economic livelihood, kin and paisano transnational networks of help and reciprocity create the actual space for contending formal limits to upward mobility. These social networks represent a transnational response by migrants to a structural situation of global inequality at two sites. Just as their networks aided them in responding to the global inequality that yielded the macro-level causal factors for migration in Peru , so too they have helped them in adapting to the unsteady labor markets that confront them in the global city of New York .
Relations between and among kin and paisanos have structured Peruvian network, determining the nature and limits of mutual aid and conflict negotiation. Furthermore, the unstable nature of immigrant links to labor markets has led to greater reliance on interpersonal networks, as well as on different network structures. Network membership is in itself an asset with short-term costs balanced against shortand long-term insurance for a wide variety of risks, some of them quite unknown at the time of investment. What is particularly important to note is the changing nature of the social bonds of trust and solidarity in the context of Peruvian immigration, with immigrants striving in the unsteady conditions of the New York City labor market.
More specifically, controlling for job insecurity and wage levels, Peruvians have found ways to increase their potentials for economic and social growth: first, through multiple incomes earned within a household, and, second, through social arrangements to share undertakings and nonmonetary resources. Given diminishing job security and a downward trend in real wages, this process has not occurred without tight economic constraints and risks of defaulting on commitments. And yet, without disregarding the conflicts among kin and paisanos carried along the way, social undertakings such as remittances, loans for airfare, helping kin construct a home, juntas and job search assistance have reinforced community-based support, even as they have transformed the customary ways that Peruvians build and reinforce ties to one another. As a Peruvian immigrant told me on the subway at six o'clock one weekday morning on the way to his construction job, "We have to help each other, that is the only way." References
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[*] I myself immigrated to New York City from Lima in the 1990s, a step that was made possible by my parents' migration from the Andes to Lima in the 1960s.
[1] I myself immigrated to New York City from Lima in the 1990s, a step that was made possible by my parents' migration from the Andes to Lima in the 1960s.
[2] About 40 percent of the Peruvians in New York City reside in the Borough of Queens, in neighborhood such as Astoria, Elmhurst, Jackson Heights, Woodside, Corona, Flushing, Richmond Hill, and Jamaica-Hillcrest (Department of City Planning 1992).
[3] This figure is based on the following calculations: in 1990 there were 32,000 legal Peruvian residents in New York State, of which 75 percent lived in New York City (Bureau of the Census 1993c, 44, 307). The rate of growth of the Peruvian population in New York between 1980 and 1990 was 100 percent (Rodriguez 1995), so assuming the same rate for 1991-95, in 1996 legal Peruvians in New York City would approach 64,000. Based on my interviews, I also estimate that this number should be increased by 25 percent to include undocumented Peruvian immigrants, for a total of 80,000.
[4] The data for male employment can be deduced by subtracting female from total figures.
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Fotos:
Peruanos desfilando el dia de la Hispanidad, el 12 de octubre, en la Quinta Avenida de la ciudad de Nueva York. 12 de Octubre de 2004 (Fotos de AQL)
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